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Housing has been one of the most volatile
and, over the last ten years, most troubled of
industries. The causes of housing's problems
are varied and complex, but one of them de-
serves special mention-the imperfect function-
ing of the mortgage market. Because most new
residential housing acquisition is financed by
mortgage debt, conditions in the mortgage mar-
ket are important to the housing industry. This
paper examines one special aspect of the mort-
gage market, the mortgage instrument. It con-
siders, first, whether the characteristics of the
conventional fixed interest rate mortgage
(FRM) may have both limited and destabilized
the supply of mortgage funds and, second,
whether an alternative mortgage plancontaining
a variable rate may increase and smooth the
supply without reducing demand.'
In this paper, we analyze the implications of
variable rate mortgages (VRMs) for both
lenders and borrowers. We pay particular em-
phasis to the experiences resulting from the use
of VRMs by six large savings and loan associa-
tions and one large·bank in California which
have been offering these mortgages since 1975.'
The California experience is the most wide-
spread use of VRMs in the country, and thus
should provide useful insights for other areas.
Because many VRM characteristics are stipu-
lated by law, we examine the implications of
these constraints and recommend specific
changes in those features which appear to re-
duce the efficiency of the instrument.
FRM and VRM: Theoretical Issues
Most mortgage funds are supplied by private
financial institutions. At year-end 1975, savings
and loan associations had extended 51 percent
of all residential mortgages outstanding, com-
mercial banks 17 percent, mutual savings banks
10 percent, and life insurance companies 4 per-
cent. Government supported agencies extended
13 percent and other private lenders 5 percent.
Although they are the largest lenders of mort-
gage loans, thrift institutions (savings and loan
associations and mutual savings banks) and
commercial banks have complained of the rela-
tive lack of profitability of mortgage lending,
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and have at times appealed to the Federal
governmentfor assistance. Inresponse, the gov-
ernment has introduced a host of mortgage sub-
sidy programs and has limited the costs of
depository mortgage-lending institutions by im-
posing ceilings on the rates they may pay on
savings and time deposits. The latter restriction,
popularly referred to as Regulation Q, not only
limits cost increases for the bulk of the funds
available to depository institutions, butalso pro-
vides thrift institutions with a slight deposit rate
edge over commercial banks as a means of en-
couraging savings flows into the thrifts. Evi-
dence suggests, however, that these restrictions
have not improved the operation of the mort-
gage market. At times market rates of interest
have risen sharply above the Q ceilings, andfunds have been redirected away from institu-
tions not offering competitive rates. This has
exacerbated the volatility of mortgage flows.
The growing evidence of the unsatisfactory per-
formance of these government programs has
stimulated a search for other ways of assisting
mortgage lending institutions which would have
fewer side effects on the mortgage market.
Maturity and interest-rate intermediation
Because residential dwellings are both big-
ticket items and long-lived assets, they are
financed primarily by long-term mortgage loans
collateralized by the dwelling purchased. Many
of the institutions extending such loans raise
their funds by selling securities in the form of
deposits with considerably shortermaturities, so
that they engage in maturity intermediation. In
addition, to the extent that the mortgages have
a fixed rate of interest over their life, while rates
on deposits may vary through time, the institu-
tions also engage in interest-rate intermediation.
Although these two activities in the past have
been identical, they do not necessarily have to
be so. In fact, the VRM represents a device for
separating the two types of intermediation.
Economic theory tells us that the relationship
between a long-term rate and a short-term rate
onsecurities which are similar in all respects but
term to maturity is determined largely by the
expected course of short-term rates during the
remaining life of the longer-term security. If
we assume a world of perfect certainty in which
the values of all future short-term interest rates
are known, the long-term rate is a geometric
average of the current short-termrate and future
short-term rates on out to the maturity of the
long-term security. This implies that, if a de-
positorymortgage-lending institutionis to break
even, abstracting from costs of operations other
than interest rates, the rate it charges on a fixed
rate mortgage should be the geometric average
of the current deposit rate and the deposit rates
it expects to pay until the mortgage matures.
This relationship is illustrated in Figure 1.
Time is measured on the horizontal axis and
interest rates on the vertical axis.
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Q. Assume that there is no prepayment provi~
sion, and that the current deposit rate at P is A
and that deposit rates are expected to rise
steadily through the period C in Q. Again,
abstracting from operating costs and a competi-
tive return on capital, the appropriate fixed rate
on the loan would be B. At the rate B, the
expected total return on the loan would equal
the expected total of deposits over the life of
the loan, so that the institution would break
even on its intermediation operations. The dol-
lar gain in the triangle ABO would be exactly
equal to the loss in the triangle OCD.
Although the intermediary breaks even over
the life of the mortgage, in any arbitrary shorter
period, e.g., one year, it may be incurring either
a profit or a loss. In our example, with deposit
rates expected to increase, the loan rate will be
above the initial deposit rate, so that the inter-
mediary will be generating a profit. Through
time, as deposit rates increase, the profit be-
comes progressively smaller unti~ at Z the de-
posit rate is equal to the loan rate. Thereafter,
the deposit rate rises above the loan rate and
the institution experiences progressively larger
losses. Thus the appropriate accounting period
for evaluating the performance of the inter-
mediary is the life of the loan and not any
shorterperiod.
Under some circumstances the losses may
precede the gains, with the loss and gain tri-
angles reversed. In such a case, short-term
loans from another financial institution or froma government agency may be needed to ease the
institution's resulting liquidity problem. It
should be noted, however, that the problem is
one of liquidity and not of solvency.
Our analysis demonstrates that in a world of
certainty the return on any successive combina-
tion of shorterterm investments summing to the
maturity of the mortgage loan will be the same
as for the mortgage loan itself. This is true be-
cause the long-term rate is an average of any
combination of composite shorter-term rates
and the latter, in turn, are averages of their
composite shorter-term rates. Thus, the return
on a 1a-period loan is equal to that of two com-
parable five-period loans-andthelatter return,
in turn, is equal to that of 1acomparable one-
period loans. In a world of certainty, long-term
maturity and long-term interest-rate intermedia-
tion are just as advantageous as similar shorter-
term intermediation.
Figure 1 also shows that, if the loan rate
changes in synchronization with the deposit rate,
the gain and loss periods are eliminated and the
institution breaks even at all times. In this in-
stance, the institution engages only in maturity
intermediation without interest-rate intermedia-
tion.
Effect of uncertainty
We can now remove the assumption of per-
fect certainty so that future rates are only ex-
pected rates. If the intermediary's deposit rate
expectations are realized, the analysis is un-
altered. The institution breaks even on its fixed
rate mortgage lending but experiences sub-
periods of gains and losses. If expectations are
not realized, then it no longer breaks even. If
deposit rates rise slower than anticipated, say
along line AF in Figure 1, the gain triangle will
be enlarged and the loss triangle reduced. The
institution earns greater profits than expected.
Conversely, if deposit rates rise faster than an-
ticipated, say, along line AE, the loss triangle
will be greater than the gain triangle. The in-
stitution will generate lasting losses and experi-
ence a solvency problem. Because it is lasting,
7a solvency problem requires a different solution
than a short-term liquidity problem.
When an intermediary extends a long-term
loan at a fixed interest rate, it accepts the risk
that the underlying expected short-term interest
rates may not be realized. Although this may
result in gains or losses, many market partici-
pants are risk averse and assign greater weight
to an extra dollar loss than to an extra dollar
gain. A fixed rate mortgage contains two com-
ponents for the borrower: (1) a long-term fi-
nancingcommitment and (2) insurance against
loss from higher than expected short-term inter-
est rates. Like any insurance seller, the lender
will charge a premium for the interest rate in-
surance. The premium would be related to the
expected loss, or the probability of losses from
greater than expected interest rate increases
multiplied by the magnitude of the associated
loss. This premium is added to the long-term
rate obtained by averaging the relevant expected
short-term rates. If this is done and deposit
rates are realized, the gain triangle will exceed
the loss triangle. In Figure 2 the solid line AC
is now the expected path of short-term rates,
and the dotted lines above and below AC repre-
sent the degree of uncertainty about that path.
The rate BBI is purely expectational, based on
expected future short-term rates. This is the
standard explanation of the mortgage interest
rate without risk. BD is the insurance premium
payable by the borrower and is proportional to
the amount of risk. With the total market inter-
est rate at PBI there is neither a profit to the
intermediary nor a net loss to the fixed rate
mortgage borrower, because the cost of provid-
ing insurance for the former and the cost of
purchasing insurance for the latter are the
same. If short rates turned out below expecta-
tions, long rates would fall and the borrower
would wish to refinance. With no prepayment
penalty an underpriced premium would imply
that realized losses exceeded expected losses,
and the intermediary would incur net losses on
its lending.
The analysis also indicates that the profit-
ability of fixed rate mortgage lending is depen-
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rate changes are realized, and not on the shape
of the yield curve. Financial intermediaries
can operate as profitably under descending or
flat, as under "normal" ascending yield curves.
Thrift institutions, in fact, expanded as rapidly
as commercial banks between 1905 and 1930,
though the yield curve was downward sloping
throughout almost all of that period. Except
where the yield curve is flat, realization of ex-
pected interest rates shifts the yield curve, and
consequently, the level of profitability reflects
the extent to which changes in the yield curve
are greater or less than those consistent with
the realization of expected rates. Fixed rate
mortgage lending can be profitable to inter-
mediaries even if short-term rates rise more
than long-term rates, provided that the increases
do not exceed expectations.
Implicationsof VRM
Variable rate mortgages are long-term mort-
gage contracts in which the interest rate changes
at prearranged periods, in sympathy with
changes in some designated market interest rate
thatis referred to as the standard index..
4 Unlike
a series of consecutive short-term loans, a VRM
avoids the transactions costs that accompany a
new mortgage note. As Figure 1 indicates, a
VRM would simplify the operations of the in-
termediary by eliminating or greatly reducing
interest rate intermediation. Under the assump-
tions that VRM interest rates 1) change con-
currently with deposit rates and 2) are trans-
lated into changes in the dollar amount (rather
than in the number) of monthly payments, the
institution's interest receipts and payments areperfectly synchronized and no interest rate risk
arises.
What happens to the interest rate risk? If
there are no constraints on VRM interest rate
changes, all the risk is shifted to the borrower.
The latterknows the amountof the first monthly
payment and the length of the mortgage, but
not the amount of the subsequent payments or
of the total payments. In contrast, on a fixed
rate mortgage he would know the amount of all
payments and the length of the payments. If
interest rates over the life of the mortgage
changed in line with market expectations, the
borrower would pay the same average rate on
the VRM as onthe FRM (less the FRMinterest
rate insurance premium), although the time pat-
tern of the payments would be different. If
short-term interest rates increased more than
expected, the VRM would be costlier to the
borrower than the FRM, while if short-term in-
terest rates increased less thiln expected, the
VRM would be cheaper.
A compromise between an FRM and a full
VRM would involve a risk-sharing arrangement
between the lender and borrower.
5 This could
be accomplished by placing a symmetrical max-
imum interest rate band on either side of the
rate on a new mortgage. Within the band, the
borrower assumes the risk; outside theband, the
lender assumes the risk. The wider the band, the
greater the risk assumed by the borrower. The
two polar cases are represented by an infinitely
wide band, which is a pure VRM, and an infin-
itesimally narrow band, which is a pure FRM.
The California Experience
Six large state chartered savings and loan
associations in California began offering VRMs
in early ormid-1975. Five of these associations
rankin the top tenin the country. (Theirexam-
ple was followed at year end by the Wells Fargo
National Bank, the eleventh largest commercial
bank in the nation.) These six savings and loan
associations together extended some $1.7 mil-
lion of VRMs between April and December
1975-about two-thirds of the total mortgages
they made in this period. Although this experi-
ence is too brief to develop meaningful conclu-
sions, some tentative impressions can be ex-
pressed. On the whole, the VRM is a much
more complex instrument than either lenders or
regulators generally realize. As a result, regula-
tions and pricing practices could limit the value
oftheinstrumenttoboth lenders and borrowers.
In addition, difficulties could arise under seven
different headings, as described below.
Standard index
Regulations of the California Savings and
Loan Commissioner tie the rate on VRMs to a
standard index, defined as the last published
weighted average cost of savings, borrowings,
andFederal Home Loan Bank advances to Cali-
fornia member associations of the Federal
Home Loan Bank of San Francisco. Commer-
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cial banks offering VRMs also use this S&L cost
of funds index. However, the index presents
three problems, two economic and one political.
First, when individual lenders are forced to
use an all-lender index, those institutions in
capital-short areas may be discouraged from
bidding more aggressively for deposits by offer-
ing higher interest rates, knowing as they do
that the rates on their outstanding mortgages
will not be increased correspondingly. Because
a lender's decisions on the deposit rates it pays
will not greatly affect the index value, some
individual institutions could bid less aggressively
for funds by offering lower rates and still benefit
from higher mortgage rates. This reduces com-
petition among individual lenders.
Secondly, the index is published semi-an-
nually with a lag of two to eight months, and
thus does not reflect current market rates. If
market dates decline in any period, the drop will
not be reflected in the index until later. Yet to
be competitive with FRM lenders, VRM lenders
must lower their rates in the current period. In
the absence of a decline in the standard index,
they can remain competitive only by reducing
the differential between the market rate and the
standard index. This spread, which remains
constant over the life of the mortgage, is de-
signed to compensate the intermediary for theeosts and risks of operations, which remain
unchanged. A lower spread than necessary to
cover the costs would, of course, lead to un-
profitable operations over the life of the mort-
gage. It would appear at first that lower than
required spreads when the standard index lags
a decline in market rates would be offset by
higher than required spreads when the index
lags an increase inmarket rates. But because of
the combined impact of prepayment provisions
and limits on maximum interest rate changes,
borrowers are encouraged to switch from higher
spread mortgages to lower spread mortgages,
reducing the profitability of lending institutions.
A more appropriate solution would be the use
of an up-to-date index, such as a two-month
moving average of the cost of funds for individ-
ual institutions.
Lastly, a political problem arises because the
cost of funds index is greatly affected by Regu-
lation Q. Major increases have occurred in the
costoffunds index in pastperiods whenRegula-
tion Q ceilings were increased. Because in-
creases in Reg Q ceilings would lead to increases
in rates onall outstanding VRM mortgages, and
not only on new mortgages, it is reasonable to
predict that all homeowners would exert sig-
nificant political pressure to maintain-or even
reduce-Reg Q ceilings as market rates rose.
Iffinancial intermediaries could not offer com-
petitive deposit rates, depositors would transfer
their funds away from these institutions into
private capital markets, depriving the mortgage
market of funds.
Maximum interest rate limit
A limit on the maximum VRM interest rate
change causes the risk of unexpected interest
rate changes to be shared between lender and
borrower. Two difficulties exist with the current
California regulations regarding this limit. First,
they make possible asymmetrical rate changes
for the affected savings and loan associations.
The rate cannot be increased more than 21/2
percentage points above the initial rate, but
there is no limit on the amount it can decline as
the standard index falls below the initial rate.
This regulation places a greater share of the
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risk on the lender, increasing the rate that he
is likely to charge on each new loan. Also, be-
cause borrowers are allowed to prepay without
penalty within 90 days of any announced in-
crease in loan rates, they have an incentive to
shift into newVRMs during any later period of
declining market rates in order to take advan-
tage of lower maximum VRM rates.
Secondly, the maximum limit is based upon
the initial VRM rate rather than upon the rate
on a comparable FRM extended at the same
time. This feature benefits VRM borrowers
who obtain their mortgages when deposit or
short-term rates are high, because they can not
only ride the rates down, but can also convert
to new VRMs with lower maximum interest
rate limits. On the other hand, lenders are un-
able to recoup these losses from those borrowers
who obtain their mortgages when rates are low
and assume only limited upside risk. As a re-
sult, lenders must charge a higher interest rate
in order to be compensated for the added risk.
Limits on the maximum interest rate change'
also cause new VRMs to differfrom comparable
outstanding VRMs, either in the loan rate or in
the maximum permissible loan rate. These dif-
ferences, in tum, may encourage lenders and
borrowers to shift from old to new mortgages,
and thereby encourage the use of prepayment
and assumption restrictions to compensate
either party for potential losses from such trans-
fers.
Prepayment fees
Prepayment fees on mortgages have fre-
quently been a problem for lenders. If the pre-
paymentpenaltyfees are nonexistent ortoo low,
in periods of low interest rates the lender will
experience losses from expected income and be-
come reluctant to engage in additional lending
under the same conditions. Casual inspection
suggests that prepayment penalties generally
have not been very severe on fixed rate mort-
gages, so that borrowers have been able to re-
finance into lower rate mortgages in periods of
declining rates. On the other hand, borrowers
were locked into lower rates during periods of
rising market rates. This situation has helpedmake FRMs unfavorable instruments for lend-
ers.
If there were no limits on changes in VRM
rates, old VRMs would yield the same rate as
new VRMs ofthesame creditquality-andthus
there would be no advantage to borrowers to
refinance at lower rates, no loss to lenders, and
no need for prepayment fees. However, rates
are generally not free to fluctuate without limit.
If the maximum interest rate limits are either
asymmetrical or centered around the initial
VRM rate rather than the comparable FRM
rate, it may be advantageous for the borrower
to refinance into a new VRM when interest rates
decline sufficiently. This, of course, would be
disadvantageous to the lender, so that he would
be likely, if permitted by law, to impose prepay-
ment penalties on VRMs when market rates fell
below initial rates. At other times, there would
be no loss to the lender, so that he would be
likely to permit prepayment without charge.
The California code permits prepayment of
VRMs without penalty anytime within 90 days
of an announced increase in loan rates. Thus,
if rates had been falling for a period, borrowers
would be able to refinance into new, lower rate
VRMs after the first announcement of an in-
crease. This provision should be changed to
permit prepayment without charge at any time
the loan rate is at or above the initial rate. At
other times, when the loan rate is below the
initial rate, prepayment penalties should be
permitted.
Loan assumptions
Most conventional FRMs have "due on sale"
clauses, which permit the lender to demand re-
payment of the outstanding balance (plus pre-
payment fees) at the time the mortgaged prop-
erty is sold. This feature permits the lender to
extend a new mortgage at a higher loan rate if
market rates have risen since the initial mort-
gage contract. Restrictions on the assumption
of an existing mortgage by the property buyer
are analogous to unrestricted prepayment, with
two differences: the option to terminate the loan
rests with the lender rather than the borrower,
and the injured party is the borrower when in-
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terest rates are above the initial rate (rather
than the lender when interest rates are below
theinitialrate).
Because of these general similarities, loan
assumption provisions may be analyzed best
relative to prepay1l1entprovisions. If there are
no .prepayment penalties to compensate the
lender when interest rates dedine, equity sug-
gests that assumption should be restricted so as
not to compensate the borrower wheninterest
rates increase. (Although the burden of higher
rates falls. directly on the buyer, the new mort-
gage rate affects the price at which property can
be sold and thus indirectly affects the seller.)
On the other hand, if sufficient prepayment
penalties arepermittedto compensatethelender
for any loss he may experience, restrictions on
assumption would not appear to be warranted.
Unlike prepaymentpenalties, only part of th@
assumption penalties-the part made up of the
higher rate on the new mortgage-accrues to
the lender. The remainder is absorbed in the
process of obtaining a new promissory note,
in the form of search loss, title insurance costs,
recordingcosts, and legal costs. Thus, the effec-
tive assumption costs to the borrower are
greater than the benefits to the lender.
As in the case of prepayment provisions, if
there were no restrictions on VRM maximum
interest rate changes, there would be no need
for assumption restrictions. The rate on a new
mortgage would be the same as on the old
mortgage. However, as already noted, restric-
tions on interest rate changes may at times not
make the two mortgages equivalent, so that
either the borrower or the lender can find some
advantage at such times in choosing between a
new and an old mortgage. As a result, some
VRMlenders have imposed assumption restrict-
tions similar to those on FRMs, even though
unrestricted assumption has often been cited as
an advantage of VRMs.
Because only part of the benefit from re-
stricted assumption goes to the lender, it would
help both sides if these restrictions were modi-
fied. One alternative is to reset the maximum
interest rate band each time the property were
sold. (This could be done without having towrite a new promissory note.) Theband on the
existing mortgage would then be equivalent to
thatona comparable new VRM. Thenecessary
legal changes could be achieved with only a
minorchangeinthe California code.
Implementation of ratechanges
Changes in loan rates may be implemented
either .•as changes in the dollar amount of
monthly paYl1lents or as changes in the number
of unchanged monthly payments. Because de-
posit ratechanges are reflected only in changes
in the amount of interest payments, discrepan-
cies between the time of inflows and outflows
are reduced if loan rate changes are imple-
mented in the same fashion, making interest
receipts match interest payments. However,
VRM loanrates can increase sharply, increasing
monthly payments sharply, while most borrow-
ers' incomes increase only slowly. As a result,
borrowers may occasionally experience pay-
ments difficulties.
To ease the burden of such rate changes,
lenders frequently permit increases in loan rates
to be implemented, at the option of the bor-
rower, as increases in the number of monthly
payments ratherthanin the dollar amount. This
eliminates interest rate risk, but because cash
inflows and outflows are not snychronized,
liquidity problems may still arise. The lender
may need to meet deposit rate payments before
receiving his loan rate payments. Thus, when-
ever a lender increases the length of a mortgage
in response to loan rate increases, he should
reserve the right to shorten the length again to
the original maturity in the event rates decline.
California regulations permit VRM rate in-
creases to be translated into increases in the
number of monthly payments, provided that the
remaining life of the mortgage does not exceed
40 years. Although this is reasonable for a
mortgage with 20 ormore years left to maturity,
it appears to be an unnecessarily long extension
for shorter mortgages. If rates increased over
time, some mortgages might neverbe completely
repaid. A change in the regulations, permitting
mortgage maturities to be lengthened by no
more than, say, 10 years in response to loan
12
rate.increases, couldhelp lenders without creat-
ing any undue problems for borrowers.
Complexity of mortgage contract
Because a VRM is a complex instrument, the
VRMcontract or promissory note is also com-
plex--much more so than an FRM contract.
Like theFRM note, the VRM note must specify
the initial •interest rate, the amount of the
monthly payments, and the length of the mort-
gage. But in addition, the VRM note must also
stipulate the conditions under which the interest
rate can change,the methods bywhich an inter-
estratechange maybeimplemented, the options
available to either side for implementing rate
changes, the maximum and minimum limits on
interest rate changes, the frequency of possible
rate changes, and the maximum limits on the
total interest rate change over the life of the
mortgage. VRM prepayment provisions are
also more complicated, since they can shift with
the relationship of the current market rate with
the initial rate. Lastly, the legal provisions
applicable to VRMs are numerous, complex,
and subject to frequent changes.
Asa result, it is easy for errors to appear in
the promissory note. An analysis of the notes
used bythe seven major users of VRMs in mid-
January, 1976, revealed that many contained
errors of nonconformity with the state laws and
regulations then in effect. The largest number
oferrors pertained to the alternative procedures
by which loan rate changes could be imple-
mented. Such errors are not binding on the
borrower, but they do reduce the amount of
information provided and thereby lower the
borrower's ability to evaluate the contract.
Inaddition, almost all of thepromissory notes
omittedinformationthatwas materially relevant
to the ability of the borrower to understand the
provisions and the value of the standard index
at the time the loan was originated. Because of
the complexities of the instrument, lenders and
borrowers alike should benefit from the devel-
opment of a model VRM contract. This would
be of considerable use to lenders in preparing
their own promissory notes and to borrowers in
becoming knowledgable about the information
that is materialto them.Consumer protection
The intrinsic complexity of the VRM makes
it more important to protect borrowers against
errors resulting from incorrect or omitted ma-
terial information. One source of error unique
to VRMs arises from the computation of the
change in monthly payments resulting from
changing loan rates.
Interest rates on almost all new residential
mortgages of any type are denominated in mul-
tiplesofO.25 percent, e.g. 91;4 percent. Borrow-
erscan check the monthly payments.that are
consistent with this rate and the.loan maturity
by using a standard mortgage payments table.
(Computations of these amounts without the
assistance of a calculator or computer is not
recommended.) However, as interest rates
change, the loan rate on outstanding VRMS can
be in multiples smaller than 0.25 percent. In-
terest rate fractions in these smaller multiples
are not included in standard mortgage tables.
Thus there is no easy way for a borrower to
check the monthly payment stipulated by the
lender and obtained through the use of a com-
puter. To remove doubts about the accuracy of
such figures, all VRM lenders should make
available at their offices a monthly mortgage
payments table, perhaps in computer printout
form, for all interest'rate fractions and maturi-
ties in which their mortgages are outstanding.
California law requires lenders to provide
borrowers with at least 30 days' written notice
before the effective date of a change in VRM
loan rates. When the economy is stable, with
only small changes in marketinterestrates, there
may be no changes in VRM loan rates for ex-
tended periods of time. But some borrowers
may forget that these rates can actually change,
and be both surprised and upset when an in-
crease in monthly payments finally occurs.
Lenders would be well advised to send borrow-
ers a briefnotice on everymortgage anniversary,
possibly describing interest rate developments
in the mortgage market since the last notice and
reminding them that their loan rates could
change if market rates change sufficiently. At
least one smaller California savings and loan
association, which has used VRMs for some
13
years, has found such a program successful in
defusing borrower animosity to rate increases.
Evaluation of VRM
The mortgage industry has developed the
VR.Mas an alternative and/or supplement to
the FRMin order to reduce the financial pres-
sures on mortgage-lending financial intennedi-
aries, to increase the flow of funds through the
mortgage market, and to stimulate the purchase
of additional housing. Hence, the usefulness of
the VRM as a mortgage instrument can be
evaluated by examining its actual and potential
impacts on the mortgage and housing markets.
This, in turn, requires a determination of the
advantages and disadvantages of VRMs, rela-
tive to FRMs, for mortgage borrowers and lend-
ers. These advantages and disadvantages can
be set forth in tabular form, based in part on
theoretical considerations, and in part on our




1. Possible gain from lower than currently
expected interest rates over the life of the
mortgage.
2. Possible gain from lower prepayment
fees.
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3. Possible gain from more liberal assump-
tionprovisions.G
4. Greater availability in periods of great in-
terest rate uncertainty.
Disadvantages
1. Possible loss from higher than expected
short-term interest rates and need to pre-
dict interest rates.
2. Possible risk of financial strain if mort-
gage rate increases sharply but family in--
come remains unchanged.
3. Greater complexity of mortgage contract.
4. Difficulty of ascertaining accuracy of
changes in monthly payments as a result
of changes in standard index.
Mortgage Lenders
Advantages
1. Reduced solvency problem from risk ofhigherthan expected cost offunds through
shifting of part or all of risk to borrower.
2. Reduced liquidity problem through in-
creased synchronization of interest pay-
ments and receipts, whenever changes in
loanrates are translated into correspond-
ingchanges in dollar amount of monthly
payments.
Disadvantages
1. Difficulty in pricing of new VRMs and
potential inability to compete for new
mortgages in periods of declining rates be-
cause of standard index lagging behind
market rate changes.
2. Reduction in potential gains from lower
than expected cost of funds.
3. Elimination ofpotential profit from sale of
"interest rate insurance."
4. Lack of synchronization of monthly pay-
ments and receipts, and possible liquidity
problems, whenever changes in standard
index are translated into changes in num-
ber of monthly payments.
5. Necessity of educating borrowers in com-
plexities of mortgage contract, and possi-
ble borrower animosity whenever rates
are raised on outstanding mortgages.
6. Difficulty in designing features of mort-
gage contract and simple promissory note.
Mortgage Market
Advantages
1. Possible increase in supply of funds from
lenders.
2. Possible smoother supply of funds over
the cycle.
3. Protection of solvency of thrift institu-
tions, provided that new contracts are
priced correctly.
Disadvantages
1. Possible decrease in demand for funds by
borrowers because of greater risk.
2. Possible pressure on government from
mortgagors to prevent increases in stand-
ard index, particularly through use of
Regulation Q to hold down cost of funds




Possiple greater demand for new and im-
proved housing from greater availability
ofmortgagefunds.
2. Possible smoother demand for new and
improved housing over cycle from
smoother flow of mortgage funds.
3. Possiple greater demand for new and im-
proved housing from increased ability of
ll.Omeowners to sell, as a result of more
liberal prepayment and assumption pro-
visions.
Disadvantages
1. Possible reduced housing demand from
reduced demand for mortgages.
2. Possible reduced housing demand from
(a) increased disintermediation if free
movement of standard index is restricted;
and (b) mispricing of mortgage if stand-
ard index is not sufficiently current.
Conclusion
The VRM is a complex instrument, much
more complex than first analysis would suggest,
and there is good evidence that it is not yet fully
understood by any of the parties concerned-
borrowers, lenders, orregulators. The potential
success or harm of the VRM is heavily depen-
dent upon the regulations and practices defining
its .characteristics. The California experience
highlights a number of requirements that must
be met for the VRM to operate successfully:
1) the need to select an appropriate stand-
ardindex;
2) the need for thrift institutions io under-
stand fully the complexities of maturity
and term structure intermediation;
3) the need to offset political pressures for
greater government interference with in-
terest rates;
4) the need to determine loan rate changes
in the light of the desired degree of risk
sharing and the implications for prepay-
ment and assumption provisions;
5) the need to "educate" borrowers;6) the need to design the promissory note to
provide complete, accurate, and under-
standable disclosure of all material infor-
mation;
7) the need to provide proper protection to
borrowers; and
8) the need for careful marketing ofboththe
initialcontract and subsequent changes in
interest rates.
Inappropriate decisions in any of these areas
could.greatly reduce the potential contribution
of·VRMs. The California experience to date
suggests that it may not be easy to realize the
fullpotential of this mortgage instrument.
APPENDIX
How aVRM Works
The VRM is a long term mortgage contract in
which the loan rate may change periodically, con-
currently with changes in some predetermined mar-
ket rate of interest, referred to as the standard
index. The provisions governing the relationship
between the loan rate and the standard index are
stipulated in the promissory note and, in part, are
established by state statute or regulation. These
provisions generally include the fixed differential
between the standard index and the loan rate, the
frequency at which the loan rate may be changed,
the amount by which the loan rate may be changed
(at any single time and over the life of the note),
and the method by which changes in the loan rate
are translated into changes in the monthly pay-
ments (and at whose option). In California, many
of these provisions are stipulated either in the State
Civil Code or regulations of the Savings and Loan
Commissioner.
The operation of a VRM may be illustrated with
a hypothetical example developed in Table A-I.
The standard index is the actual current value of
the average cost of funds of insured savings and
loan associations in the San Francisco Federal
Home Loan Bank District.l The loan rate is as-
sumed to be 11/2 percentage points (150 basis
points) above the standard index, to compensate
the lender for all costs of operation and provide
himwith a competitive return. Changes in the loan
rate are subject to the following restrictions:
1. Limitperchange:
maximum = 25 basis points
minimum = 10 basis poirits
2. Carryover: changes in the standard index
greater than 25 basis points or less than 10
basis points are carried over to the next and,
if necessary, subsequent periods and added to
the change in the index at that- time.
1This rate is not published until some months after the
close of the respective semiannual period. Nevertheless,
we assume here that it is available at the beginning of the
period, in order to have a current index that permits
lenders to price their new mortgages at the current mar-
ket loan rate without changing the rate differential.
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3. Number of changes: no more than one per
six month period.
4. Overall limit: 250 basis points from the rate
on a comparable fixed rate mortgage ex-
tendedonthesame date.
The carryover (or cumulative) provision requires
the computationoftwo numbers:
Total loan rate carryover (TC) = UCl + /':, SI
Unused loan rate carryover (UC) = UCl +
/':, SI-P /':, =TC-P 6
where:
SI = change in standardindex
P 6 = permissible change in loanrate
UC.l = unused carryoverinprevious period
A $20,000, 30-year VRM is assumed to be ex-
tended on January 1, 1967, at 6.85 percent, based
on a standard index of 5.35 percent. (A compar-
able FRM is assumed to cost 7 percent.) In the
second semiannual period, the standard index de-
clines by 32 basis points. As a result, the loan rate
is reduced by the maximum 25 basis points to 6.60
percent. The l'emaining 7 basis points are included
in the unused carryover and aI'e applied to the
change in the next period. By the end of the first
half of 1975, the standard index had climbed to
6.41 percent, or 106 basis points over its initial
value. The loan rate had increased by 105 basis
points to 7.90 percent. In the 16 semiannual peri-
ods following the origination of the mortgage, the
standard index had declined five times and in-
creased 11 times, while the loan rate had declined
twice and increased seven times.
The montWy payments, as the table shows, are
$131.06 in the first six months when the interest
rate is at the initial 6.85 percent level. The pay-
ments then decline to $127.77 in the next six month
period when the loan rate declines to 6.60 percent.
(This assumes that all changes in the loan rate are
translated into changes in the dollar amount of
monthly payments.) In the first six months of
1975, the last semiannual period shown, the month-
ly mortgage payments have increased to $143.24.The unpaid balance at the end of this period is
$17,754.10.
In contrast, aFRM extended on January 1, 1967
at a 7-percent fixed rate would call for constant
monthly payments of $133.20. At the end of the
period, the unpaid balance would be $17,703.20,
only $50 less than on the VRM. Of course, if in-
terest rates had increased faster, the .difference
would have been greater, but the initial rate on the
FRM may also have been higher.
FOOTNOTES
1. For a discussion of alternative changes in mortgage
plans, see D. Lessard and F. MOdigliani, New Mortgage
Designs for Stable Housing in an Inflationary Environment
(Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1975).
2. Another large commercial bank began offering VRMs
after the conclusion ofthe study.
3. The interest rate on the vertical axis is scaled in terms
of the logarithm of 1 plus the interest rate, to reflect re-
investment of the interest on both the mortgage and the
deposit, as is required by the definition of compound
interest.
4. The operation of a typical VRM is shown in Appendix
(A).
5. The risk could also be. shared or aSSUmed totally by the
Federal government as a third party. For such suggestions
see .George •G.Kaufman, "The.Case for Mortgage Rate
Insurance," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, No-
vember 1975, and James L. Pierce, "A Program to Protect
Mortgage Lenders Against Rate Increases," in Financial
Institutions and the Nation's Economy (FINE), Committee
on Banking and Currency, U.S. House of Representatives,
November 1975.
6. Prepayment and assumption provisions depend on the
magnitude of the maximum interest rate band and degree
of risk sharing. The larger the spread, the more liberal the
provisions are.
TABLE A"l
Monthly Payments and Unpaid Balance








































































































































t$20,OOO, 30-year mortgage extended January 1, 1967.
*Initial loan rate 6.85 percent.
tLoan rate = 7 percent.
@At endofsemi-annual period.
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